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Abstract: 
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”), a U.S. territory located in the Pacific 
Ocean just north of Guam, is one of few American jurisdictions in which the traditional cultural practices celebrated 
by a minority of the population have the force of law. Problematically, many of these laws are uncodified and no 
longer practiced by the majority of people in the jurisdiction. The CNMI judiciary often stumbles through cases of 
first impression with no guidance from the CNMI legislature, resulting in conflicting case law. This article surveys 
the customary law in place in the CNMI, and considers the obstacles of applying this law in a society whose culture 
and customs are rapidly evolving. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Assistant Attorney, North Slope Borough Law Department, Barrow, Alaska. The author served as a law clerk for 
the Superior Court from 2005 to 2007 and was involved in many of the probate cases discussed in the article. Cases 
cited are on file with the author. Only the CNMI Supreme Court cases after 1990 are available on Westlaw, although 
Westlaw’s reporter citations are inaccurate. 
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The Survival of Customary Law in the Northern Mariana Islands 
 
There are few American jurisdictions in which the traditional cultural practices celebrated 
by a minority of the population have the force of law, even when these practices are at times 
uncodified, imprecise, and disputed. In 1975, after three centuries of foreign rule, the people of 
the Northern Mariana Islands established such a jurisdiction—the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”). This article surveys the customary law in place in the 
CNMI and considers the obstacles of applying this law in a society whose culture and customs 
are rapidly evolving. 
 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 The Northern Mariana Islands was initially inhabited by the Chamorro people, who 
arrived some 3500 to 4000 years ago.1 Spanish colonization, beginning in 1668 with the 
establishment of a Jesuit mission, led to a dramatic decline in the Chamorro population.2 After a 
series of revolts, the Spanish government relocated the entire native population from the islands 
of Saipan and Rota in the Northern Marianas to the neighboring island of Guam.3 Not until the 
late 19th century were the Chamorros allowed to return.4
  Many aspects of traditional Chamorro culture collapsed as the surviving Chamorros 
adapted to Spanish rule.5 Some aspects of the ancient culture were brought to light in the mid-
20th century with the work of archeologist Alexander Spoehr. Spoehr’s work, Saipan: The 
 
1 SCOTT RUSSELL, TIEMPON I MANMOFO’NA: ANCIENT CHAMORRO CULTURE AND HISTORY OF THE NORTHERN 
MARIANA ISLANDS 78 (1998). 
2 Id. at 13. 
3 Britannica Encyclopedia Online, Northern Mariana Islands History, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-
273249/Northern-Mariana-Islands (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).   
4 Dan MacMeekin, The Northern Mariana Islands: A Political-Legal Chronology 1521 – 1930, 
http://macmeekin.com/Library/NMIchron/1521.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2007). 
5 RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 13. 
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Ethnology of a War-Devastated Island (1954), is the only text consistently relied on by modern 
courts to gain insight into traditional Chamorro culture and law.6
In the 19th century, the Refaluwasch, or the Carolinian people, immigrated to the 
Northern Marianas from the neighboring East and West Carolinian islands7 and established 
permanent settlements.8 Although they did adopt Christianity, the Carolinian people retained a 
culture that was distinct from both Chamorro and Spanish culture.9 Today, there are more 
vestiges of traditional Carolinian culture than of Chamorro culture, such as the wreath (known as 
mar-mar) still worn by many Carolinians.10
Spain was forced to sell Guam to the United States at the end of the Spanish-American 
War in 1898.11 Shortly after, the United States sold the Northern Mariana Islands to Germany in 
1899.12 After World War I, the Northern Mariana Islands were mandated to Japan by the League 
of Nations.13 In 1947, after World War II, the United Nations established the Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands, naming the United States as Trustee over the Northern Marianas and other 
Micronesian islands.14  
In 1975, the Northern Mariana Islands entered into a covenant with the United States 
whereby the islands would become a semi-autonomous Commonwealth under the sovereignty of 
 
6 See, e.g., Arriola v. Arriola, No. 97-049, 6 N.M.I. 1, 1999 MP 13 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999);  In re Estate of 
Aguida Amires, No. 95-012, 5 N.M.I. 70, 1997 MP 8, 1997 WL 33480210 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. May 12, 1997). 
7 These include what is now the Federated States of Micronesia.   See Alexander Spoehr, Saipan: The Ethnology of a 
War-Devastated Island, in FIELDANIA: ANTHROPOLOGY 41, 326 (Chicago Natural History Museum, 1954)  (“[T]he 
main body of the Saipan group [of Carolinians] migrated from atolls lying just to the west and north of Truk.”). 
8 Northern Mariana Islands Council for the Humanities, “About the CNMI,” 
http://www.nmihumanities.org/about_cnmi.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2007). 
9 Based on the author’s observations while living on Saipan from 2005 to 2007. 
10 Id. 
11 Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754. 
12 RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 25. 
13 DOI Office of Insular Affairs, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 
www.doi.gov/oia/Islandpages/cnmipage.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2007). 
14 Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands art. 3, July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301. 
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the United States.15 This Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands in Political Union with the United States (“Covenant”) spells out the division of power 
between the United States and the local government. 
The CNMI is generally subject to federal law and the U.S. Constitution, with the 
exception of the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments. In order to provide representation from each 
of the populated islands, the Covenant disregards the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
guarantee of “one person, one vote.”16 Equal protection is also limited by prohibitions on the 
alienation of land  from people who are of not of Northern Marianas descent.17 The application 
of the Sixth Amendment is limited by the Attorney General’s ability to prosecute some offenses 
in the absence of a jury trial.18 The local government also currently maintains independent 
control over immigration, customs, and taxation. This, however, may change with the passage of 
bills pending in the U.S. Congress that provide for a federal takeover of immigration.19
The CNMI has a limited statutory code, which was not enacted until 1984.20 The 
statutory code contains some specific provisions for applying traditional customary law, 
primarily with respect to inheritance matters and the distribution of land.21  While most of the 
statutory code is now comprised of public and local laws enacted by the CNMI Legislature, 
 
15 Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States 
of America, 48 U.S.C. § 1801, 94 Pub. L. No. 241, 90 Stat. 263 [hereinafter Covenant].  On November 3, 1986, 
following the approval of the Covenant by Congress, a formal presidential proclamation terminated the Trusteeship 
with the Northern Mariana Islands,  thereby conferring United States citizenship on CNMI residents pursuant to 
§301 of the Covenant.  Proclamation No. 5564, 51 Fed. Reg. 40399.  The United Nations officially terminated the 
Trusteeship in December 1990.  S.C. Res. 683, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2972d mtg. at 29 (1990). 
16 Covenant, supra note 15, at § 203(c);  see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964) (holding equal protection 
requires that both houses of a state legislature be apportioned by population). 
17 Covenant, supra note 15, at § 805(a).  
18 Id. at § 501. 
19 In December 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 3079, which provides for the U.S. federal 
government to take over CNMI immigration. H.R. 3079 awaits Senate action as part of S. 2483, an omnibus bill 
made up of some 50 House-approved bills.  Agnes E. Donato, Federalization bill now heads to full US Senate, 
SAIPAN TRIBUNE,  Feb. 01, 2008, http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=76623.  
20 See Northern Mariana Islands Public Law 3-90, effective January 1, 1984. 
21 See generally 8 N.M.I. Code. 
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many provisions derive from pre-CNMI law.22 Further, Trust Territory law may still apply in 
certain situations, such as in the probate of the estate of a decedent who died during the Trust 
Territory time.23 To the extent that these laws are silent, courts apply uncodified customary law 
(based on evidence offered by litigants) or U.S. common law (depending on the area of law).24 
Given its youth, the jurisdiction has little of its own common law to apply. 
 Cases pertaining to Commonwealth law are brought in the CNMI Superior Court, a court 
of general jurisdiction with five divisions.25 Appeals are directed toward the three-justice panel 
that constitutes the CNMI Supreme Court.26 Appeals from this court to the U.S. Supreme Court 
are extremely rare.27  
 
II. APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY LAW 
A. Land categorization under the CNMI Code 
The categorization of land is important in determining which probate laws apply. Most of 
this law is codified in the CNMI Code.  
 
 
 
22 See Covenant, supra note 15, at § 505;  see also U.S. Department of the Interior Secretarial Order 2989 at IV 
Section 1 (Northern Mariana Islands  laws in effect prior to the Covenant and not inconsistent with the Covenant or 
other applicable U.S. laws shall remain in force). 
23 See 8 N.M.I. Code § 2102;  In re Estate of Manuel Aldan, No. 95-028, 5 N.M.I. 50, 1997 MP 3, 1997 WL 
33480205 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 1997). 
24 See 7 N.M.I. Code § 3401 (2004) (“For civil matters, the rules of the common law, as expressed in the 
restatements of the law approved by the American Law Institute and, to the extent not so expressed as generally 
understood and applied in the United States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the Commonwealth, in the 
absence of written law or local customary law to the contrary.”). 
25 See 1 N.M.I. Code § 3203. 
26 Pursuant to the Covenant at § 403, the Supreme Court was established on May 1, 1989.  See 1 N.M.I. Code § 
3101.  Prior to the creation of the Supreme Court, the Covenant at § 402 vested in the U.S. District Court with 
original federal jurisdiction as well as appellate jurisdiction over CNMI law matters.  
27 The Covenant at § 403 provided that for 15 years following the creation of the Supreme Court, appeals from that 
court would go to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, rather than to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
As of May 1, 2004, CNMI Supreme Court appeals can be (but seldom are) taken directly to U.S. Supreme Court.   
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1. Carolinian customary law 
Under Carolinian customary law, property is held either in one's individual capacity or as 
family land.28 The CNMI Code recognizes family land as land acquired “from one or more 
Carolinian ancestors, and held by the person as customary trustee for the use of the family 
members.”29 Family land is held by a customary trustee for the equal enjoyment of all 
descendants of the original land owner.30 Estate of Ernesto Rangamar explains the concept of 
family land: 
Most Carolinians in the Northern Marianas descend from Carolinians “who 
migrated ... from ... the Caroline chain.” With them they brought and were able to 
maintain for a while “much of their old social organization, customs and 
language.” Among these customs was “their traditional land tenure pattern.”  
. . . 
Traditional Carolinian land tenure is matrilineal, and land descends by the 
minimeal [sic] lineage, i.e., mother to daughter. The land under this tenure system 
is collectively owned and controlled by females.  
. . .  
Matrilineal land was held, pursuant to Carolinian land custom, collectively by the 
females and recorded in the name of the oldest female member of the maternal 
line, with the oldest holding title and acting more or less as a “trustee” for the rest 
of the lineage members.31
 
Rangamar goes on to say that the system was somewhat distorted by the various systems for 
registration of family land under the successive German, Japanese, and Trust Territory 
administrations: 
The German administration began a system of land registration, under which both 
maternal lineage lands held collectively by females and lands received by 
Carolinian males under a newly initiated homestead program were registered.32 
Carolinian males received title to homestead land, which was recorded in their 
individual name. 
                                                 
28 Estate of Ernesto Rangamar, No. 92-029, 4 N.M.I. 72, 76-77, 1993 WL 614806 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15, 1993).  
29 8 N.M.I. Code § 2107(l) (stating that the acquisition can be “by law or decision of the family or by inheritance”).    
30 8 N.M.I. Code §§ 2904(b), 2910.  
31 Estate of Ernesto Rangamar, 4 N.M.I. at 76-77 (citations, footnotes and emphasis omitted).  
32 The registration system did not usually record the names of the other female owners of the land. It was from this 
registration system that the term “customary trustee” evolved.  Id. at 77 n.14. 
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. . . 
The Carolinian males that received property under the homestead program held 
the land individually. While some of these males gave their land to both female 
and male heirs, others chose to give the land only to their daughter(s) who then 
“subsequently founded a new matrilineal lineage.” Hence, the applicability of 
Carolinian land custom to such lands became dependent upon the subsequent 
treatment of the land by the female recipient(s) of the land. 
. . . 
The Japanese administration continued the German administration's system of 
registering both land held individually and matrilineal land. Under the American 
administration, however, Carolinian lands began to be registered in either the 
name of an individual Carolinian or in the name of the heirs of a decedent with a 
trustee designated, without regard to gender.33  
 
For land held by an individual Carolinian, “[u]nless the family consents or agrees 
otherwise,” the land becomes family land upon the individual’s death and passes to the oldest 
surviving daughter as a customary trustee.34
Any alienation of Carolinian family land, erection of a permanent structure on the land, 
or occupation of a permanent structure requires the consent of the family, which is determined by 
majority vote of the customary trustee and his siblings.35 A court will presume land held by a 
Carolinian to be family land unless the original owner showed clear intent to hold it otherwise.36
2. Chamorro customary law 
Like Carolinian custom, Chamorro custom distinguishes between individually owned 
land and “ancestors’ land,”37 known as iyon manaina. The CNMI Code defines ancestors’ land 
as “land acquired...from one or more of [the owner’s] Chamorro ancestors of Northern Marianas 
                                                 
33 Id. at 76-77 (citations, footnotes and emphasis omitted).  
34 8 N.M.I. Code § 2905.  
35 See 8 N.M.I. Code §§ 2904(c), 2907, 2909.  This relationship applies “[u]nless the family consents or agrees 
otherwise.”  Id. at § 2909.  For deceased siblings with descendants, the descendants may vote by representation.  Id. 
36 See In re Estate of Francisca Lairopi, No. 97-1234, 2002 MP 10, at ¶ 12, 6 N.M.I. 417, 2002 WL 32983565 
(N.M.I. Sup. Ct. May 16, 2002).  
37 8 N.M.I. Code §§ 2902-2903;  Estate of Mariana Deleon Guerrero, No. 87-295, 1 N.M.I. 301, 306, 1990 WL 
291871 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. July 20, 1990) (applying pre-code intestacy law under Chamorro custom).  
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descent.”38 As discussed below, the only significance of this distinction is that the spouse of the 
decedent receives a life estate in the decedent’s ancestors’ land rather than the one-half share 
received for other property.39  
 3. Article XII
Article XII of the Constitution is one peculiar aspect of CNMI land law that has nothing 
to do with customary law, but does relate to culture. Article XII limits permanent and long-term 
(more than 55 years40) land acquisition to people who are at least one-quarter Northern Marianas 
descent and corporations that are 100 percent Northern Marianas owned.41 The expressed policy 
goals for this restriction are to (1) protect Northern Marianas persons from exploitation, (2) 
promote economic advancement and self-sufficiency, and (3) recognize the importance of 
ownership of land for the culture and traditions of the people of the CNMI.42 As Professor 
Marybeth Herald points out, the law and the Ninth Circuit Court decision upholding the law43 
assume the following: (1) there is no threat of exploitation or cultural dislocation when Northern 
Marianas persons sell their land to ambitious or unscrupulous persons who happen to be of the 
                                                 
38 8 N.M.I. Code § 2107(a).  
39 8 N.M.I. Code §§ 2902-2903. 
40 The Second Constitutional Convention Amendment 35 (1985) extended the original provision (ratified 1977, 
effective 1978) from 40 years to 55 years.  
41 See N.M.I. Const. art. XII, § 3: “The term permanent and long-term interests in real property . . . includes freehold 
interests and leasehold interests of more than fifty-five years including renewal rights, except an interest acquired 
above the first floor of a condominium building.”  A person is of Northern Marianas descent if “a citizen or national 
of the United States and ... at least one-quarter Northern Marianas Chamorro or Northern Marianas Carolinian blood 
or a combination thereof” or if adopted before the age of eighteen by a person of Northern Marianas descent.  Id. at 
§ 4.  For determining descent, the constitution considers a person “to be a full-blooded Northern Marianas Chamorro 
or Northern Marianas Carolinian if ... born or domiciled in the Northern Mariana Islands by 1950 and ... a citizen of 
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands before [November 3, 1986].”  Id.  A corporation is eligible to own land 
only if “it is incorporated in the Commonwealth, has its principal place of business in the Commonwealth, has 
directors one-hundred percent of whom are persons of Northern Marianas descent and has voting shares . . . one-
hundred percent of which are actually owned by persons of Northern Marianas descent.”  Id. at § 5.  Article XII' s 
alienation restrictions “are not subject to equal protection analysis” under the U.S. Constitution.  Wabol v. 
Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1463 (9th Cir. 1992). 
42 Covenant, supra note 15, at § 805; Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1461. 
43 See Wabol, 958 F.2d 1450. 
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correct Northern Marianas ancestry; (2) all outsider land purchasers constitute a threat; (3) and 
the 55-year alienations do not constitute a threat. 44 The policy also appears to assume that more 
subtle forces (i.e., the adoption of modern American comforts and values) will not distort the 
culture and traditions.45  
 Although Article XII does not concern customary law, it does come into play in cases in 
which the application of statutory or customary law (such as passing land to one’s children) 
would violate Article XII.46 More often, however, Article XII works with customary law, as it 
reduces the opportunities for Northern Marianas persons to sell their family land. From the 
perspective of the courts, Article XII adds another factor to consider when discerning whether 
statutory, common, or customary law should be applied.47
 
 
 
44 Marybeth Herald, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag into the United States Territories or Can it Be 
Separately Purchased and Sold?, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 707, 744-745 (1995). 
45 There are no restrictions on adopting casino gambling or allowing foreign owned and staffed hotels, topless bars, 
and garment factories (all of which rely on the CNMI’s massive pool of cheap immigrant labor)—actions that 
intrude on the culture and change it.  See Marybeth Herald, The Northern Mariana Islands: A Change in Course 
Under Its Covenant with the United States, 71 OR. L. REV. 127, 186-87 (1992). 
46 E.g., Estate of Edives Imamura, No. 89-1009, 5 N.M.I. 60, 1997 MP 7, 1997 WL 33480209 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. May 
1, 1997) (holding the Superior Court did not err in concluding that non-Northern Marianas grandchildren did not 
acquire any interest in their grandmother’s estate through inheritance).  As the number of inter-marriages increase 
between Northern Marianas persons (as defined in the CNMI Constitution) and non-Northern Marianas, the Article 
XII restriction will result in more conflicts with customary law on inheritance.  
47 In Estate of Tudela, the CNMI Superior Court held that (1) section 2411 of the CNMI code (providing for a 
“person not of Northern Marianas descent” can receive by devise or descent “the maximum allowable legal interest 
in … real property” with any remaining interest passing to the next closest heirs or devisees eligible to own land in 
the CNMI) was an improper legislative attempt to transform an unconstitutional acquisition of a long-term interest 
in land by a non-NMI descent person; (2) the application of section 2601 (giving a surviving spouse has rights to 
exempt property of the decedent's estate) to non-NMI surviving spouses unconstitutional, as it would improperly 
allow the transfer of a family home to a person of non-NMI descent, in violation of Article XII (where there are 
children of the decedent); and (3) section 2902 is unconstitutional in its application to a non-NMI spouse, as it 
allows the spouse of a decedent to obtain a life estate in ancestral land with the children taking a vested remainder in 
fee simple, contrary to Article XII.  No. 86-884, slip op. 12-13, 1992 WL 397525 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. May 22, 1992).  
The court thus declined to apply the statutory law.  The CNMI Supreme Court overruled this decision on other 
grounds and did not consider the constitutional issue.  See 4 N.M.I. 1, 1993 WL 307683 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. June 16, 
1993). 
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B. Discerning the law of intestate succession 
At the turn of the 21st century, very few of the probate cases handled by the Superior 
Court concern testate successions. It is not uncommon for an intestate succession to take place 
decades after the decedent’s death.48 Sometimes the only impetus for probating an estate is the 
government’s exercise of eminent domain and the resulting need to determine which heirs should 
be awarded the proceeds of the forced sale.49 In these delayed probate cases, the estate’s only 
asset is land or proceeds from the sale of land. 
The CNMI Code is the starting point for determining the law on intestate succession, 
although case law contains numerous examples of departures based on family agreements and 
uncodified customs presented to courts by expert witnesses.50 Under the CNMI Code, intestate 
succession varies depending on whether the decedent was Chamorro, Carolinian, or neither.51  
1. Chamorro customary law 
Under Chamorro custom, a life estate in ancestors' land passes to the surviving spouse 
with priority of succession for the remainder to descendants and then to siblings and their 
descendants.52 If the decedent does not have a surviving spouse (which is usually the case in old 
estate cases), then priority of succession for ancestors' land is to descendants and then to siblings 
                                                 
48 See, e.g., Estate of Lorenzo Rofag, No. 89-019, 2 N.M.I. 18, 1991 WL 70067 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 1991) 
(finding the decedent died in 1944; probate initiated in 1989); In re Estate of Joaquin Dela Cruz, No. 90-023, 2 
N.M.I. 1, 1991 WL 70072 (Sup. Ct. N.M.I. Feb. 7, 1991) (finding the decedent died in 1948; probate initiated in 
1987). 
49 See, e.g., Estate of Angel Malite, No. 97-369 (finding decedent died in early 20th century, probate filed for third 
time in 1997);  In re Estate of Vicenta Kaipat, No. 04-0090 (finding decedent died in early 20th century, probate filed 
in 2004).  The Superior Court does not have a record of either death.  
50 See infra Section III(C). 
51 A separate statutory regime which has nothing to do with custom exists for decedents not of Northern Marianas 
Chamorro or Carolinian descent.  See 8 N.M.I. Code § 2912.  What happens when families are of mixed decent is 
unclear. Usually heir-claimants assert that they have practiced a particular culture’s customs and would like to 
proceed under that culture’s customary law.  E.g., Sullivan v. Tarope, No. 98-1293, 2006 WL 1109449 (N.M.I. Sup. 
Ct. Apr. 18, 2006).  
52 See 8 N.M.I. Code § 2902(a), (c).  Succession to heirs is “per stirpes.”  Id. at § 2915. 
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and their descendants.53 For all other property under Chamorro custom (i.e., personal property 
and individually acquired real estate), one half passes to the surviving spouse and one half passes 
to the descendants.54 If the decedent does not have a surviving spouse, then all such property 
passes in priority of succession to descendants, to parents, and then to siblings and their 
descendants.55
An important Chamorro tradition that is not codified is the succession of the family 
home.56 Traditionally, the surviving spouse gets a life estate in the house, with the remainder 
going to the child who has cared for and lived the longest with the parents.57  
2. Carolinian customary law
Under Carolinian custom, intestate succession depends upon whether property is family 
land, other real property, or personal property, but the statutory intestate succession scheme is 
subject to change upon family agreement.58 For family land in which the decedent was the 
customary trustee, another family member will become the customary trustee and the land will 
retain its nature as family land “[u]nless the family consents or agrees otherwise.”59 As the above 
                                                 
53 8 N.M.I. Code § 2902(b), (d). 
54 8 N.M.I. Code § 2903. 
55 Id.  
56 A surviving spouse has rights to exempt property of the decedent's estate consisting of “the primary family home 
and lot, household furniture, one automobile, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects.”  8 N.M.I. Code § 2601. 
57 See SPOEHR, supra note 7, at 143;  see also Diaz v. Taylor, No. 97-0879 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 1997), slip 
op. at 5 ( “The daughter or son who stays with the parents and cares for them receives the family home as a reward 
in most instances.”).  The home may also be transferred before death by a revocable oral conveyance.  Discussed 
infra Section II(E).  See Diaz, slip op. at 5;  Estate of Antonia Iglecias, No. 05-0142 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 
2005).  
58 These rules are flexible. All sections in the Commonwealth Code concerning Carolinian probate custom contain 
the phrase: “[u]nless the family consents or agrees otherwise.”  8 N.M.I. Code §§ 2904-11. 
59 8 N.M.I. Code § 2904 (a).  Priority of succession to customary trustee is to the oldest surviving sister, to the oldest 
surviving brother, to the oldest surviving daughter of decedent and his siblings, to the oldest surviving son of 
decedent and his siblings, to the decedent's oldest surviving granddaughter, and finally to the decedent's oldest 
surviving grandson.  Id.  If none of these are available, the family (or the court) chooses a customary trustee.  Id. at § 
2904(a)(6). 
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quoted portion of the statutory code suggests, family agreement can and often does override the 
code.  
Integral in family agreements on intestate succession is the role of the customary trustee 
and possibly that of a figure described in some cases as the telap (chief). In Estate of Isaac 
Kaipat, an expert witness on Carolinian culture testified that, while the oldest female acts as a 
trustee for the family property, it is the oldest son of the oldest female who acts as the telap and 
spokesperson for the family.60 Carolinian culture requires the telap to work with the trustee and 
other heirs in making decisions.61 In Estate of Remedio Malite, however, a different expert 
witness referred to the female trustee of family land as the telap.62  
The power of the statutory code is also limited by the idea that it can be disproved by 
custom. In Willbanks v. Stein, after deciding that Chamorro custom applied, the Superior Court 
described a particular statute providing for inheritance of an illegitimate child63 as the “best 
evidence of applicable Chamorro custom.”64 The CNMI Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
this section of the CNMI Code sets forth a standard of proof rather than evidence of custom.65 
The Supreme Court stated, “[w]hile the probate code may reflect certain aspects of custom, it 
does not, standing alone, establish custom as a matter of law.”66 The Supreme Court instructed 
the trial court to take further evidence, if warranted, on the issue of custom.67
 
60 No. 05-0247, slip op. at 4 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2006) (Order Following Evidentiary Hearing and Denying 
Heirship Claim on Behalf of the Estate of Dolores K. Pelisamen).  It is possible for a person to assume the role as 
telap even if he is not the oldest male, provided that this is the decision of the family.  Id.  
61 Id. 
62 No. 06-0163, slip op. at 11 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. May 25, 2006) (Order Confirming the Mwei Mwei Adoption of 
Jesus Somol and Recognizing the Estate of Jesus Somol as an Heir to the Estate of Remedio Malite). 
63 8 N.M.I. Code § 2918(b)(2). 
64 No. 91-0337, slip op. at 3 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. July 19, 1993). 
65 Willbanks v. Stein, No. 91-0337, 4 N.M.I. 205, 206, 1994 WL 1886694 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Dec. 6, 1994). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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Thus, the CNMI Code often serves as the baseline for determining intestate succession, 
rather than a set of bright-line rules. Where the rules are altered, courts must go through the 
difficult process of determining who is the customary trustee (under Carolinian custom), who 
said what (often many years ago), which expert has the best knowledge of customary law, and 
whether the family has actually followed customary law. 
 
C. Conflicting laws and customs regarding marital property 
The Commonwealth Marital Property Act of 1990,68 based on the Uniform Marital 
Property Act,69 established a community property regime in terms of “marital property” and 
“individual property.”70 Under the Act, the surviving spouse retains a one-half undivided interest 
in marital property, subject to the Article XII alienation restrictions.71 While this rule seems 
fairly clear, 21st century courts often deal with cases in which a decedent died prior to the 
application of the 1990 law.72 A brief review of the case law for these estates demonstrates the 
confusion created by conflicting customs and the application of traditional and modern common 
law.  
In Matagolai v. Pangelinan, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands 
sitting as an appeals court rejected the application of community property principles in the CNMI 
in the absence of legislation explicitly providing for them.73 Noting that community property is a 
 
68 8 N.M.I. Code §§ 1811-1834. 
69 See Reyes v. Reyes, No. 97-0167, 2004 MP 1, ¶ 27, 2004 WL 3704880 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2004.);  
8 N.M.I. Code § 1811 cmt. 
70 Estate of Manuel Aldan, No. 95-028, 5 N.M.I. 50, 52, 1997 MP 3, ¶ 16, 1997 WL 33480205 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 
13, 1997).  
71 8 N.M.I. Code § 1820(c).  In general, marital property is property acquired by either spouse during the marriage 
except for property received by gift, devise, or descent to one spouse alone or for property traceable to one spouse's 
individual property.  See id. at § 1820. 
72 P.L. 7-22, effective February 22, 1991, is not retroactive.   
73 3 CR 591, 597 (D. N. Mar. I. App. Div. 1988). 
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product of civil law rather than common law, the court applied the Anglo-American common 
law vesting all ownership in the husband.74
In Estate of Mariana Deleon Guerrero,75 the CNMI Supreme Court upheld the Superior 
Court’s ruling76 that property purchased during the marriage and listed only the husband's name, 
belonged to the husband alone. Relying on Spoehr’s treatise,77 the court found that Chamorro 
custom provided for ownership of all of the wife’s property to vest in her husband upon the 
wife’s death.78
In Ada v. Sablan, the CNMI Supreme Court (also relying on Spoehr’s treatise79) 
considered a different Chamorro custom known as patte pareho to find that both spouses had an 
equal ownership interest in property acquired during marriage.80 The Supreme Court also relied 
on the CNMI Constitution’s equal protection clause.81 This finding overruled the Superior 
Court’s common law based finding that all property acquired during marriage belonged to the 
husband separately.82  
In Estate of Manuel Aldan, a case brought after the Marital Property Act but concerning a 
death during the Trust Territory era, the Superior Court decided that “Deleon Guerrero must be 
read in the light of the prohibition against sex discrimination embodied in Article I, § 6 of the 
Commonwealth Constitution.”83 The Superior Court reasoned that since in Deleon Guerrero all 
property vested in the husband when the wife died, it is only fair that all property vested in the 
 
74 Id. 
75 No. 87-295, 1 N.M.I. 302, 1990 WL 291871 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct.  July 20, 1990). 
76 Estate of Mariana Deleon Guerrero, No. 87-295 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 1989). 
77 See Spoehr, supra note 7, at 140. 
78 Estate of Mariana Deleon Guerrero, 1 N.M.I. at 306.  
79 See Spoehr, supra note 7, at 135-136. 
80 No. 89-419, 1 N.M.I. 415, 423-24, 1990 WL 291959 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Nov. 16, 1990).  
81 Id. at 424 (citing N.M.I. Const. art. I, § 6). 
82 Id. 
83 No. 90-0490, slip op. at 3 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 1995). 
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wife when the husband died.84 The court concluded that not to do so would result in sex 
discrimination against the wife, in violation of the CNMI Constitution.85  
The CNMI Supreme Court reversed, finding that when the husband died, his property did 
not vest in his wife; it vested in his children (including illegitimate children not born to his 
wife).86 The court drew from Palacios v. Coleman,87 which held that when the property descends 
to the children, there is a corresponding custom which requires the children to support their 
widowed mother during her lifetime.88 The court found that the wife benefitted from the 
Chamorro custom in which her children provided for her needs for the remainder of her life.89  
 These cases suggest two competing versions of Chamorro customary law—one version 
allows a husband to take all of the wife’s land, while patte pareho90 provides for community 
property. Added to the confusion is the relevance of the CNMI’s equal protection clause, which 
was relevant to the Ada Supreme Court and the Aldan Superior Court, but not to the Aldan 
Supreme Court and the Ada Superior Court. Thus, although the Marital Property Act appears to 
establish a community property regime, there are no clear rules to apply to many estates which 
remain to be probated. 
As of this writing, the Superior Court is currently considering another variant on 
Chamorro customary law with respect to rights accruing from marriage: gumagachong, the 
Chamorro customary equivalent of common law marriage. The court must decide whether 
 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Estate of Manuel Aldan, No. 90-0490, 5 N.M.I. 50, 1997 MP 3, 1997 WL 33480205  (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 
1997). 
87 1 CR 34, 36 (D.N.M.I. 1980)  
88 Estate of Manuel Aldan, 1997 MP 3, at ¶ 11.  
89 Id. at ¶ 16.  
90 To date, only one other CNMI court has referred to patte pareho.  See Reyes v. Reyes, No. 97-0167, 2004 MP 1, ¶ 
27, 2004 WL 3704880 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2004) (suggesting that the Marital Property Act of 1990 codified the 
doctrine of patte pareho). 
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custom requires that the family members of a deceased gumagachong partner provide some 
share of the estate to the surviving partner.91 As the Marital Property Act neither recognizes nor 
prohibits gumagachong,92 the outcome of this case may result in another example of “judicial 
codification” of customary law that will impact future rights. 
 
D. The uncertain effect of customary adoption on inheritance 
Intestate succession treats illegitimate children and “adopted” children as legitimate, 
natural children.93 The question of what constitutes “adoption” frequently arises in cases 
attempting to determine adoption for purposes of inheritance. Both the Carolinians and the 
Chamorros practice a form of customary adoption that may or may not grant full inheritance 
rights.  
1. Carolinian customary law 
The Carolinian practice of mwei-mwei is typically viewed as a valid adoption for 
inheritance purposes,94 although a Carolinian family can agree to treat an adopted child as not 
belonging to the family for purposes of family land rights and intestate succession.95
Mwei-mwei occurs when a single adult or a married couple chooses to raise a child as if it 
were the natural child of the adopting party with the consent of the natural parent or parents.96 
                                                 
91 See Estate of Charles Reyes, No. 06-0554 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. ____). 
92 The CNMI legislature has nevertheless recognized that there is a “customary marriage” in the CNMI for certain 
purposes.  See 6 N.M.I. Code § 103(t) (defining spouse to include “the husband of wife of a customary marriage” for 
purposes of criminal law, thereby allowing customary marriage to serve as a defense to a charge of rape (see 6 
N.M.I. Code § 1302)).   
93 8 N.M.I. Code § 2918. 
94 See Estate of Lorenzo Rofag, No. 89-019, 2 N.M.I. 18, 31-32, 1991 WL 70067 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 1991) 
(affirming heredity through mwei-mwei); but see Estate of Remedio Malite, No. 06-0163 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. May 25, 
2006) (Order Confirming the Mwei Mwei Adoption of Jesus Somol and Recognizing the Estate of Jesus Somol as 
an Heir to the Estate of Remedio Malite) (referring to the practice of fa’am, in which the customarily adopted child 
is treated more like a foster child, and the adoption ends when the child turns 18). 
95 8 N.M.I. Code § 2908. 
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The child is usually taken in as a baby and is usually a relative of the adopting party.97 Mwei-
mwei is not terminated unless the mwei-mwei parent(s) die when the child is still young.98
2. Chamorro customary law 
The Chamorro custom of poksai is more ambiguous. In Estate of Andres Macaranas, the 
Superior Court held that there was insufficient expert testimony to prove that the Chamorro 
custom of poksai was intended to serve as a customary adoption as envisioned by the Probate 
Code.99 The CNMI Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the concept of having to provide expert 
testimony to determine the cultural connotations of poksai.100  
The CNMI Supreme Court did not discuss situations in which families take in a child for 
a temporary period, after which the child returns to its original family. However, the term poksai 
also applies to this situation.101  
The Macaranas Supreme Court ruling was distinguished by Estate of Antonia Iglecias, in 
which the claimant Velma Iglecias produced substantial evidence regarding her status as a 
pineaksi (adopted child) of her grandparents.102 This included decisions the grandparents had 
made regarding Velma’s education, residence, and discipline, as well as Velma’s receipt of her 
grandparents’ social security benefits.103 The court rejected Velma’s reliance on the Macaranas 
Supreme Court ruling to claim inheritance rights.  The court found that Velma’s claim was 
barred by her failure to produce evidence that Chamorro custom grants pineaksi the full 
                                                                                                                                                             
96 Estate of Aguida Amires, No. 95-012, 5 N.M.I. 70, 73, 1997 MP 8, 1997 WL 33480210 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. May 12, 
1997). 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 No. 01-0136, slip op. at 7 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2002).  
100 See Estate of Macaranas, 2003 MP 11, ¶¶ 13, 16, 17, 6 N.M.I. 571, 2003 WL 24267661(N.M.I. Sup. Ct. June 23, 
2003) (summarizing supreme court law concerning poksai). 
101 Interview with Judge Juan T. Lizama, Superior Court of Saipan, CNMI (Dec. 3, 2005). 
102 No. 05-0142 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2005). 
103 Id., slip op. at 2-4.  
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inheritance rights of a customarily adopted or a natural child.104 Although this finding seems to 
mirror the Macaranas Superior Court’s overturned finding, it was not appealed. The right of 
pineaksi to inherit from their adopting parents will remain unclear until the CNMI legislature 
codifies this right.   
3. Double inheritance?
In Estate of Isaac Kaipat, the CNMI Superior Court stated, “[o]ne’s status as an adopted 
child should not automatically entitle him or her to inherit from the estates of both the natural 
and adoptive parents. Evidence of an intent of the parents to bestow inheritance rights, and/or 
customary law, are needed to determine the distribution of property.”105 A subsequent ruling in 
the same case found that a child who had already inherited from his adopted parent was not 
entitled to inherit from his natural parent when the natural and adopted parents were brother and 
sister, because inheriting from both would amount to a double share in the family’s assets.106 As 
discussed infra, this decision did not result from the application of customary law, which proved 
inconclusive on this issue. Courts will likely confront this issue again, as there are many 
situations in which children are customarily adopted by close relatives (e.g., grandparents).  
 
E. Relaxations on the evidentiary and procedural rules 
 1. The partida and oral conveyances  
 By accounting for custom, the CNMI Code and jurisprudence soften the U.S. federal 
evidentiary rules upon which the Commonwealth Rules of Evidence are based. One of the most 
                                                 
104 Id., slip op. at 8.  
105  No. 05-0247, slip op. at 10 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2006) (Order Governing the Heirship Claims of the Heirs 
of Dolores K. Pelisamen and Jay Sorensen). 
106  No. 05-0247, slip op. at 5-6 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2006) (Order Following Evidentiary Hearing and 
Denying Heirship Claim on Behalf of the Estate of Dolores K. Pelisamen). 
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frequent derivations from the American rules of evidence, the partida, is based on customary 
Chamorro law. A “partida” is a Chamorro custom that occurs when a father calls his family 
together and outlines the division of property among his children.107 Courts consider partida on a 
case-by-case basis, because the means by which a partida is accomplished are flexible and the 
intent of the decedent must be effectuated where discerned.108  Since the 1983 enactment of the 
Statute of Frauds, the partida is the only form of oral conveyance permitted in the CNMI.109 
Traditional oral wills may still be applicable for cases in which the decedent died prior to the 
enactment of the Statute of Frauds.110  
A testamento is a written memorialization of a partida that “preserves in writing the 
intent and directions of the male head of the family in regards to distribution of the family's 
property.”111 Depending upon the circumstances of the case, it may be the sole evidence of a 
conveyance.112 The testamento need not meet the common law or CNMI Code evidentiary 
requirements for a will.113
 
107 Estate of Antonio Barcinas, No. 89-850, 4 N.M.I. 149, 152 n.4, 1994 WL 413255 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. July 26, 
1994).  No cases have recognized situations in which a mother performed a partida, although this situation is 
currently before the Superior Court in Estate of Trinidad Duenas, No. 05-0266 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. _____). 
108 Estate of Pedro Deleon Castro, No. 92-147, 4 N.M.I. 102,110, 1994 WL 111299 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. March 8, 
1994) (internal citations omitted);  see also Estate of Jose Cabrera, No. 88-582, 2 N.M.I. 195, 207-208, 1991 WL 
258342 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. July 31, 1991) (court found partida where father did not call family meeting but gave 
properties successively upon his children’s marriages). 
109 The NMI Statute of Frauds explicitly provides for the partida.  See 2 N.M.I. Code § 4916 (“[t]his article shall not 
apply to a partida performed pursuant to custom of the Northern Mariana Islands”). 
110 See Guerrero v. Guerrero, No. 89-569, 2 N.M.I. 61, 70-71, 1991 WL 70062  (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Mar. 18, 1991) 
(allowing testimony regarding an oral inter vivos conveyance of property occurring prior to 1983);  Estate of 
Antonio Barcinas, No. 89-850, 2 N.M.I. 437, 444, 1992 WL 62776 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Jan. 30, 1992) (“Historically, 
under local customary law no writing was necessary to devise property.”). 
111 Estate of Torres, 1 CR 237, 244 (Dist. Ct. App. Div. 1981).  
112 See, e.g., id. at 239, 244-46 (absent other evidence of partida court views testamento as customary will). 
Testamento may also serve as a written confirmation of an oral partida).  Cf. Estate of Juan Camacho, No. 87-638, 4 
N.M.I. 22, 23, 1994 WL 614815 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. July 30, 1993) (conveyance by Chamorro custom confirmed by 
document entitled Ultimo na Testamento). 
113 See Estate of Pedro Deleon Castro, No. 92-147, 4 N.M.I. 102, 1994 WL 111299 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. March 8, 
1994).  The Superior Court admitted an unauthenticated and unwitnessed document executed by the decedent, which 
outlined a distribution of his land among his relatives, and which (according to testimony) decedent showed and 
read to his wife and two of his sons. The CNMI Supreme Court found that the Superior Court did not err in 
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2. Hearsay exceptions
 Like its federal counterpart, the CNMI Rules of Evidence contain exceptions to the 
prohibition on hearsay evidence based on history and reputation. However, unlike many U.S. 
cases, this sort of hearsay evidence is often the cornerstone of disputes concerning probate, land, 
and customary adoptions. Given the delayed processing of estate successions, hearsay evidence 
may be the only evidence available in the case.114  
Commonwealth Rule of Evidence 803(20) permits the admission of hearsay statements 
relating to  “[r]eputation in a community, arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or 
customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general history 
important to the community or State or nation in which located.”115  This has been interpreted to 
allow the admission of hearsay evidence as to who owned a disputed parcel of land.116  
Rule 803(19) is another frequently relied on exception to the rule that precludes 
admission of hearsay evidence, and permits admission of hearsay testimony regarding 
“[r]eputation among members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a 
person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, 
divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other 
similar fact of personal or family history.”117 Rule 804(b)(4) is a similar exception permitting 
hearsay evidence concerning personal or family history when the declarant is unavailable.118 
Rule 803(13) allows for admission of hearsay “concerning personal or family history contained 
                                                                                                                                                             
determining that the document was a testament even though two of the distributees were not present when it was 
read. 
114 See Estate of Felipe Seman, No. 91-918, 4 N.M.I. 129, 133, 1994 WL 413208 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. June 24 1994).  
115 COM. R. EVID. 803(20).  The U.S. counterpart is identical.  See FED. R. EVID. 803(20). 
116 See Guerrero v. Guerrero, No. 89-569, 2 N.M.I. 61, 70-71, 1991 WL 70062 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Mar. 18, 1991). 
117 COM. R. EVID. 803(19);  see Arriola v. Arriola, No. 97-049, 6 N.M.I. 1, 1999 MP 13, 1999 WL 33992427 
(N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999).  The U.S. counterpart is identical.  See FED. R. EVID. 803(19). 
118 COM. R. EVID. 804(b).  The U.S. counterpart is identical.  See FED. R. EVID. 804(b);  see also Estate of Antonio 
Barcinas, No. 89-850,  2 N.M.I. 437 n.4, WL 62776 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Jan. 30, 1992). 
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in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, 
engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like.”119
 In Estate of Remedio Malite, the Superior Court actually declined to rely on written 
evidence regarding an alleged customary adoption, finding that documents containing admissible 
hearsay were not probative in this matter.120 The court stated, “[f]irst of all, the essence of mwei-
mwei is an oral agreement, without the written formalities familiar to statutory adoptions. 
Second, the documents presented to the Court are fraught with many of the same conflicts as 
those raised by the testimonies of the witnesses.”121  
 3. Affidavits
Two CNMI Supreme Court cases suggest that affidavits with references to Carolinian or 
Chamorro customary law (i.e., the partida) may not be held to the strict evidentiary requirements 
of other affidavits.  
In Sullivan v. Tarope, the plaintiff argued that the defendant’s conveyances of all of his 
property to his three daughters, without valuable consideration, and without relinquishing 
possession and control over the properties, after the entry of a California judgment, were 
fraudulent.122 The defendant argued that he gave his land by partida. To support his claims that a 
                                                 
119  COM. R. EVID. 803(3).  The U.S. counterpart is identical.  See FED. R. EVID. 803(3).  The court in Guerrero v. 
Guerrero, No. 89-569, 2 N.M.I. 61, 69, 1991 WL 70062  (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Mar. 18, 1991) explained the different 
applications of these rules: “Both Com. R. Evid. 803(13) and (19) allow hearsay testimony to be introduced if 
personal or family history is involved. Com. R. Evid. 803(20) allows hearsay testimony if boundaries of or customs 
affecting lands is involved. Com. R. Evid. 803(13) additionally requires the existence of certain specified family 
records. Com. R. Evid. 803(19) requires the additional factor of a reputation 1) among family members, 2) among 
associates, or 3) in the community. Com. R. Evid. 803(20) requires also that the testimony be reputation in the 
community.” 
120  No. 06-0163, slip op. at 2 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. May 25, 2006) (Order Confirming the Mwei Mwei Adoption of 
Jesus Somol and Recognizing the Estate of Jesus Somol as an Heir to the Estate of Remedio Malite). 
121 Id. 
122 No. 98-1293, 2006 MP 11, ¶ 19,  2006 WL 1109449 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 18, 2006). 
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partida occurred, the defendant provided the Superior Court with affidavits regarding the alleged 
partida.  
One daughter’s affidavit stated in pertinent part that,  
… My father gave me Tract Number 22886. … My father before [sic] giving me 
the deed of gift performed a partida. … The land given to me will be under my 
care under Carolinian custom. … As the oldest daughter of Jose T. Tarope, I will 
be culturally responsible for my younger sisters upon the death of my father.123   
The defendant’s affidavit stated,  
… I am of both Chamorro and Carolinian descent. … I practice both Carolinian 
and Chamorro customs. … In 1995, I suffered a heart attack. … Due to my ailing 
health in 1995, I performed the Chamorro custom of partida. … I memorialized 
the oral partida by deeds of gift which are now in question. … I gave the land to 
my daughters in conformity with the Carolinian custom of matrilineal inheritance. 
… The land was given to my children based on Chamorro custom.124
 
The Superior Court struck these affidavits as being too conclusive and containing no 
factual support for the claim that the transfers were made by a partida, such as the time, place, or 
members present when the ‘partida’ was made.”125  
The CNMI Supreme Court reversed, finding that when viewed in a light most favorable 
to the defendant, the affidavits suggested that there was a partida.126 The CNMI Supreme Court 
drew on Cabrera v. Heirs of De Castro,127 in which the trial court similarly found that an 
affidavit submitted into evidence did not rise to the level of setting forth sufficient indicia of a 
partida.128 The Cabrera Supreme Court reversed, finding that although the affidavit did not state 
 
123 Id. at ¶ 45 n.4.  
124 Id. at ¶ 45 n.5.  
125 Sullivan v. Tarope, No. 98-1293, slip. op. at 7 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2003) (Order Granting Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment);  see COM. R. CIV. P 56(e) (“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”). 
126 Sullivan v., Tarope, No. 98-1293, ¶ 48, 2006 WL 1109449 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 18, 2006).    
127 No. 88-359, 1 N.M.I. 172, 1990 WL 291857 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. June 7, 1990). 
128 Cabrera v. Heirs of De Castro, No. 88-359 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 1989) (Order Granting Summary 
Judgment). 
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the time, place, or members present when the partida was made, the declarations made in the 
affidavit should be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, i.e., that there was a 
partida.129  
 4. Property title documents
 CNMI courts need not find that property title documents are conclusive, and may rely on 
testimony to controvert title. This is because of a presumption that any land in which title is 
vested in the female head of a Carolinian family is Carolinian family land belonging to the entire 
family rather than the title holder.130  
In Estate of Rita Kaipat, the Superior Court relied on a title document rather than 
Carolinian custom in determining that an heir of the decedent was the individual owner of the 
property.131 On appeal, the CNMI Supreme Court held that failure to look behind the documents 
to determine how one heir acquired the land was an error.132 The Superior Court was thus 
required to determine whether the individual heir held title for herself or on behalf of the clan.133  
A similar case, Estate of Francisca Lairopi, concerned a dispute (in the year 2002) 
regarding title to property of an ancestor who had died before World War II.134 Members of the 
extended family who were not direct heirs of the ancestor claimed that the land was Carolinian 
family land belonging to all of them, rather than to the heirs of the ancestor’s daughter as the title 
to the property indicated. The CNMI Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court’s finding 
                                                 
129 1 N.M.I. at 177.  (“While we agree that the affidavit of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot 
state conclusive statements . . . the affidavit of Mrs. Elena Q. Sablan and the pleadings themselves do point to the 
possible existence of a “partida.”). 
130 See Estate of Francisca Lairopi, No. 97-1234, 6 N.M.I. 417, 2002 MP 10, 2002 WL 32983565  (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. 
May 16, 2002). 
131  No. 90-840, slip op. at 4 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Sep. 24, 1991). 
132 Estate of Rita Kaipat, No. 90-840, 3 N.M.I. 494, 498, 1993 WL 307672 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 1993).  
133 Id. 
134 No. 97-1234, 6 N.M.I. 417, 2002 MP 10, 2002 WL 32983565 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. May 16, 2002). 
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that the title determinations were “customary titles” rather than actual titles, such that the 
Superior Court “properly looked behind” the titles.135  
 By contrast, in Estates of Antonio Teregeyo, the Superior Court rejected the argument 
that a title in a single person’s name was a “customary title” for the benefit of the Carolinian 
family, because the title was in the name of a male instead of a family.136 The court found this 
inconsistent with the Carolinian matrilineal tradition, and determined that the land in question 
belonging exclusively to the owner rather than to the family as Carolinian family land.137 The 
CNMI Supreme Court upheld this finding.138
Likewise, in Estate of Ernesto Rangamar, the CNMI Supreme Court found that the land 
at issue was not family land because it was deeded as a homestead. 139 Thus, all of the heirs, 
including the males, were entitled to an equal undivided interest.140  
5. Res judicata
Customary law has been used to soften the effect of res judicata and the doctrine of 
applying the law of the case. For example, in Estate of Rita Kaipat, litigants presented evidence 
of a 1991 evidentiary hearing in which a testifying witness failed to mention one Carmen Guelles 
as a child of the decedent when naming the decedent’s children.141 The same witness testified at 
a 2006 hearing that Carmen Guelles was an adopted child of the decedent.142  
                                                 
135 Id. at ¶ 19. 
136 Nos. 91-0298, 91-0299, slip op. at 10-11 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Mar  14, 1995). 
137 Id. 
138 Estate of Antonio Teregeyo, No. 91-0298, 5 N.M.I. 90, 1997 MP 14, 1997 WL 33480216 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. July 
25, 1997). 
139 No. 92-029, 4 N.M.I. 72, 1993 WL 614806 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15, 1993).  
140 Id.  at 77.  The court also noted that the leasing of part of the land for fifty-five years effectively removed a 
substantial portion of the property from the family for use by the lineal heirs. 
141 No. 90-0840, slip op. at 6 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2006) (Order Re Accounting, Claims of Surveyors Juan I. 
Castro and Alfred K. Pangelinan, and Carmen Guelles’ Heirship Claim).  
142 Id. 
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Relying on a statutory expression that one of the purposes of the CMNI probate law is to 
preserve the historic traditions and culture of the citizens of Northern Marianas descent, the 
Superior Court took “judicial notice of Carolinian cultural morays.”143 The court found that part 
of the Carolinian culture “is the designation of the eldest female member of the lineage as the 
family’s spokesperson.”144 Since the witness in question was not the eldest daughter of Carmen 
Guelles, the court found that it was “understandable that another family member would be 
reluctant to speak for [the eldest daughter] in such a situation. [The eldest daughter] and her 
siblings should not be punished for [the witness’s] failure to speak up on their behalf.”145 The 
court thus relied on the witness’s statement at the 2006 hearing that Carmen Guelles was an 
adopted child of the decedent, and based on this and other evidence, ruled that Carmen Guelles 
was an heir to the decedent’s estate.146
The above cases suggest that, although the CNMI evidence and civil procedure rules are 
almost carbon copies of the federal rules, they are applied so as to favor uncodified customary 
law. 
 
F. Limitations on the jury trial—custom and culture in criminal law? 
Customary law (or at least recognition of cultural morays) can also affect criminal law, in 
particular, the right to a trial by jury.   
 
143 Id., slip op. at 7 (citing 8 N.M.I. Code § 2104(b)(4)). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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Before 1965, there was no right to trial by jury in the Trust Territory.147 The right to a 
jury trial in 21st century CNMI is limited to cases in which a defendant is threatened with a fine 
of $2000 or a five-year jail sentence.148 The Ninth Circuit in Commonwealth v. Magofna 
provides the expressed reasoning for this limitation: “the fear that the small, closely-knit 
population in the Northern Mariana Islands might lead to acquittals of guilty persons in criminal 
cases.”149 The Magofna court also commented on this closely-knit population: “[i]n such a small 
community where so many languages are spoken, ensuring juror comprehension in all stages of 
the proceedings may be a significant problem.”150  
In CNMI v. Atalig, the Ninth Circuit explained why this jury trial limitation does not 
violate the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments: it is consistent with culture and custom.151 The 
court referred to the so-called Insular Cases, which suggested that traditional Anglo-American 
procedures such as jury trial might be inappropriate in territories having cultures, traditions and 
institutions different from our own.152 The court suggested that Congress should have the 
flexibility “to avoid imposition of the jury system on peoples unaccustomed to common law 
 
147 In August of 1965, the First Congress of Micronesia enacted PL 1-7 establishing the right to a jury trial, 
conditioned on local adoption by district legislatures. In 1966, the NMI District Legislature adopted the jury trial 
provisions of the Trust Territory Code.  See 7 N.M.I. Code § 3101 cmt.  Section 501(1) of the Trust Territory Code 
contained the same language as 7 N.M.I. Code § 3101. 
148 See 7 N.M.I. Code § 3101(a) and former 5 TTC § 501(1);  see also Covenant § 501(a) “(N)either trial by jury nor 
indictment by grand jury shall be required in any civil action or criminal prosecution based on local law, except 
where required by local law.” The CNMI Constitution, which took effect on the same day as the Covenant, states: 
“The legislature may provide for trial by jury in criminal or civil cases.”  N.M.I. Const. art. I, § 8.  
149 919 F.2d 103, 106 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Report No. 4 of the Committee on Personal Rights and Natural 
Resources (Oct. 29, 1976), reprinted in Vol. II, Journal of the Northern Mariana Islands Constitutional Convention 
506 (1976)).  This matter originally came before the Trust Territory trial court and was appealed to the appellate 
division of the U.S. District Court for the CNMI. The defendant then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
150 Id. 
151 723 F.2d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 1984).  This matter originally came before the CNMI trial court and was appealed to 
the appellate division of the U.S. District Court for the CNMI. The defendant then appealed to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  
152 Id., citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148 (1904). 
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traditions”153 and to accommodate “the particular social and cultural conditions of areas such as 
the NMI.”154
 Thus, the limitation on the right to a jury trial—like the restriction of land alienation 
under Article XII of the CNMI constitution—can be justified in the face of U.S. Constitutional 
challenges by reference to the importance of respect for culture and tradition.  
 
III. FILLING IN THE GAPS  
As the above-cited cases suggest, there are numerous gaps in the statutory code (as well 
as in the concepts of customary law) that have been left for the courts to fill in. Aside from 
relying on expert witnesses in customary law, CNMI courts have extrapolated law from the 
Restatements or U.S. jurisprudence. At the turn of the 21st century, the Restatements have been a 
source of guidance on the issues of third-party beneficiary contracts,155 estoppels based on the 
acceptance of benefits,156 the applicability of arbitration,157 apparent agency,158 fraudulent 
misrepresentation,159 as well as other issues. 
 
A. The application of the Restatements 
Title 7 Section 3401 of the CNMI Code provides,  
In all proceedings, the rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements 
of the law approved by the American Law Institute and, to the event not so 
expressed as generally understood and applied in the United States, shall be the 
 
153 Id., citing Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148 (1904); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 469, (1979). 
154 Id. 
155 Aplus Co., Ltd. v. Niizeki Intern. Saipan Co. Ltd., No. 99-0532, 2006 WL 1789125 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. June 22, 
2006). 
156 Sullivan v. Tarope, Nos. 98-1293, 2006 WL 1109449 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 18, 2006). 
157 PAC United Corp., Ltd. (CNMI) v. Guam Concrete Builders, No. 00-035, 6 N.M.I. 446, 2002 MP 15, 2002 WL 
32983887 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Aug. 16, 2002).  
158 Does I v. Gap, Inc., No. 01-0031, 2002 WL 1000068 (D. N. Mar. I. May 10, 2002).  
159 Pangelinan v. Itaman, No. 93-012, 1994 WL 111281 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1994). 
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rules of decision in the courts of Commonwealth, in the absence of written law or 
customary law to the contrary.  
One CNMI court discussing this statute stated that it “provides for the almost wholesale 
application of the rules of law, in the absence of written or customary law,” and characterized the 
statute as a “shorthand attempt to fill a gap due to the absence of statutory laws in many 
areas.”160  
 
B. Majority views in American case law 
Although the Restatements are the courts’ first source of common law, courts may look 
elsewhere when the Restatements do not provide a clear solution,161 or where they appear 
outdated or inconsistent with CNMI law. For example, in Villanueva v. City Trust Bank, the 
court declined to apply the Restatement view on the right of possession under mortgage law, 
finding that a lien theory was more fitting than a title theory.162 In Manglona v. Commonwealth,  
the CNMI Supreme Court chose to apply the majority view (as opposed to the Restatement) 
treating a lease as a contract with respect to a landlord’s duty to mitigate damages.163  
 
 
160 Borja v. Goodman, No. 88-394, 1 N.M.I. 225, 238 n.4, 1990 WL 291854 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. June 26, 1990).  
Nevertheless, customary law, where it can be discerned, should take priority over common law.  Estate of Lorenzo 
Rofag, No. 89-019, 2 N.M.I. 18, 32 n.7, 1991 WL 70067 (Sup. Ct. N.M.I. Feb. 22, 1991) (“7 CMC § 3401 generally 
upholds customary law by giving it priority over common law.”). 
161 Del Rosario v. Camacho 5 N.M.I. 183, 2001 MP 3, ¶89 n.9, 2001 WL 34883245 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 2001) 
(“It is well established that the Commonwealth may look to the law of other United States jurisdictions where the 
Commonwealth's written law, local customary law, and the Restatements do not provide guidance.”);  Weathersbee 
v. Weathersbee, No. 95-0793, 1998 MP 14, ¶ 6, 5 N.M.I 183, 1998 WL 34073644 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Nov. 17, 1998) 
(applying the majority view prohibiting retroactive modification of a spousal support decree). 
162  No. 2000-13, 6 N.M.I. 346, 2002 MP 01, 2006 WL 335860 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 2006); see also Ada v. 
Sablan, No. 89-419, 1 N.M.I. 415, 425-29, 1990 WL 291959 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Nov. 16, 1990) (holding that a marital 
property regime exists in CNMI because as to property of a marriage, the common law, which is largely inapplicable 
in the several states, has principles contrary to the commonwealth constitution). 
163  No. 04-012, 2005 MP 15, ¶ 34, 2005 WL 3771373 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. 2005 MP 15 Oct. 4, 2005) (“In many 
jurisdictions, leases have come to be viewed as more properly analyzed under contract law rather than property 
law.”) (citing Teodori v. Werner, 415 A.2d 31, 33-34 (Pa. 1980);  Wesson v. Leone Enter., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 611, 
619-20 (Ma. 2002)). 
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C. When application of common law takes priority over customary law 
In Estate of Antonio Barcinas, the CNMI Supreme Court considered the estate of an 
individual who had died during the time of the Trust Territory with eight children.164 The dispute 
concerned whether land given during the lifetime of the decedent to three of the children 
precluded them from the distribution of estate land. Because the decedent died before 1984, the 
court determined that the Probate Code did not apply to the probate of his estate.165 However, the 
applicable Trust Territory Code did not provide for intestate succession. The court failed to cite 
another portion of the Trust Territory Code, which mandated that the customs of the Trust 
Territory inhabitants were to have full force and effect of law if there is no conflict with other 
laws.166 In considering whether to apply Chamorro custom, the court noted that Chamorro 
custom contained nothing akin to the common law concept of advancements.167 Instead of 
relying on Chamorro custom to invalidate the concept of advancements, the court relied on the 
common law concept of advancements.168 Accordingly, it reduced the shares of the children who 
had received land during the decedent’s lifetime.169 This case suggests that in the absence of 
relevant statutes, a court can apply an aspect of common law that has no place in customary law.  
 Recent courts have declined to apply customary law when perceiving that the litigants 
were not actually following their customs. In Estate of Wabol, the court declined to view the 
oldest daughter as the trustee of family land under Carolinian law, as she had deviated from 
 
164  No. 89-850, 4 N.M.I. 149, 1994 WL 413255 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. July 26, 1994).   
165 Id. at 152; see 8 N.M.I. Code § 2102. 
166 1 TTC § 102. 
167 Estate of Antonio Barcinas, 4 N.M.I. at 153. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
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custom when she initiated the division of the family land at issue.170 The court found that it was 
therefore not appropriate to apply Carolinian law, and used equitable principles to divide the 
property.171  
 In Diaz v. Taylor172 and Estate of Isaac Kaipat,173 the Superior Court placed the burden 
on the party relying on a custom as basis for her claim to convince the fact-finder that she (or the 
family) has actually practiced the custom at issue.174 The court noted that without such evidence, 
the court would be applying the law of a particular custom where that custom might not exist.175 
In Diaz v. Taylor, the court was asked to restore the petitioner to the residence she claimed to be 
her family home. The residence had been transferred from the petitioner to a third party via a 
non-Chamorro method of conveyance.176 Because the parties had already departed from 
Chamorro custom, the court found that the petitioner could not rely on the custom that would 
have given her the right to remain in the residence until she died.177 In Estate of Isaac Kaipat, the 
court found that litigants (as well as the CNMI Supreme Court addressing an earlier issue in the 
case) had not followed the Carolinian culture as described by their own expert witnesses.178 
Thus, the court decided to divide the disputed land equitably rather than by custom.  
When courts do decide to rely on customary law, evidence of the law may be difficult to 
procure. In Estate of Isaac Kaipat, the Superior Court qualified expert witnesses based solely on 
 
170  No. 04-0173, slip op. at 3 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2006) (Order Following the October 24, 2006 Evidentiary 
Hearing). 
171 Id., slip op. at 4. 
172 No. 97-0879 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 1997). 
173 No. 05-0247 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2006) (Order Following Evidentiary Hearing and Denying Heirship 
Claim on Behalf of the Estate of Dolores K. Pelisamen).   
174 Diaz, slip op. at 6-7; Kaipat, slip op. at 7. 
175 Diaz, slip op. at 7; Kaipat, slip op. at 7. 
176 Slip op. at 5. 
177 Id., slip op. at 7. 
178 Slip op. at 7. 
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their purported knowledge of tradition relating to community involvement.179 Witnesses offered 
conflicting testimony on the requisites to collect “double” inheritance from both the adopting and 
natural parents. The court concluded that witnesses appeared to be uncertain of what actually 
constituted the Carolinian culture, and that Northern Mariana Carolinians as a whole seemed to 
know little of the Carolinian culture as it existed in its original form in the Caroline Islands.180 
The court held that “the culture of the Northern Marianas Carolinians has already changed 
greatly from its original form. . . . It is questionable whether the traditional law of the Caroline 
Islands can be applied. . . . Following ‘customary’ law may require a shift in the determination of 
just what constitutes this law.”181 This decision demonstrates the unreliability of customary law 
and the need for legislative clarification. 
 
D. To what extent should customary law still be applied? 
Professor Stanley K. Laughlin Jr. argues that an overzealous application of the laws of 
the U.S. Constitution infringes upon local culture and is akin to genocide.182 In 1992, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the case of Wabol v. Villacrusis183 agreed with 
Professor Laughlin’s argument that “usually the indigenous culture is very much intertwined 
 
179 See id., slip op. at 2 n.1.  The Superior Court took guidance from cases involving expert witnesses in the native 
Alaskan community, in which courts qualified social workers with community experience. In re Termination of the 
Parental Rights of T.O., 759 P.2d 1308 (Alaska 1988); L.G. v. Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services, 14 
P.3d 946 (Ala. 2000).  
180 Estate of Isaac Kaipat, No. 05-0247, slip op. at 7 n.4 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2006) (Order Following 
Evidentiary Hearing and Denying Heirship Claim on Behalf of the Estate of Dolores K. Pelisamen). 
181 Id. 
182 Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., The Application of the Constitution in United States Territories: American Samoa, A 
Case Study, 2 U. HAW. L. REV. 337, 377 (1981). 
183 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1992).  This matter originally came before the CNMI trial court and was appealed to the 
appellate division of the U.S. District Court for the CNMI. The plaintiff then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  
 
8 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 63 
 
 
                                                
with indigenous control of the land.”184 Accordingly, the court rejected a claim that the U.S. 
Constitution prevented the government of the Northern Mariana Islands from restricting land 
ownership to people of indigenous ancestry.185
 This argument is less compelling when the relative number of people actually practicing 
the culture has been dwindling dramatically for some time, when customary law becomes a 
trump card186 in a dispute about rights to proceeds from land belonging to a distant ancestor, or 
when a culture is so far removed from its ancestral origins that no one really knows the 
customary law.  
In attempting to discern the customary law, courts are left to sort out the truth from 
dubious expert testimonies and an extremely limited source of written anthropological evidence. 
Even reliance on the latter is questionable. As much as Alexander Spoehr’s treatise is considered 
the authority on Northern Marianas culture, it has been disregarded in litigation. For example, in 
Estate of Aguida Amires, the CNMI Supreme Court noted, Spoehr is not accurate when he writes 
that “only babies may be adopted.”187 The court relied on testimony from Estate of Rofag to find 
 
184 Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., Cultural Preservation in Pacific Islands: Still a Good Idea-and Constitutional, 27 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 331, 332 (2005) 
185 Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462 (citing Laughlin, Jr., supra note 182, at 386-88). 
186 The Superior Court was suspicious of this sort of manipulation in the case Estate of Vicente Camacho, No. 05-
0251 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2007) (Order Denying Reimbursement of Funeral Expenses), which concerned the 
claim of a son of the decedent who had rendered himself liable for funeral expenses. Claimant had taken the 
family’s chenchules—the bundle of donations made to various family members under the Chamorro custom for 
defraying funeral expenses—which exceeded the value of the funeral expenses.  Id., slip op. at 1.  Claimant 
nevertheless sought reimbursement of his expenditures from the estate on grounds that he was saving the chenchules 
to return to the various donors at their funerals.  Id., slip op. at 2. He argued that this was the proper use for 
chenchules under Chamorro custom. At an evidentiary hearing, no one presented expert testimony on the Chamorro 
custom of chenchule.  Id.  The judge relied on his own knowledge of the custom of the acceptance of chenchules by 
the deceased’s relatives to defray funeral expenses, not to serve as collateral for use at other funerals.  Id.  The court 
granted claimant leave to produce expert testimony to the contrary; he did not do so.  Id. 
187 No. 95-012, 5 N.M.I. 70, 73, 1997 MP 8, ¶ 20 1997 WL 33480210 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. May 12, 1997). 
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that “[n]ormally, the child to be adopted is a baby, but there is evidence that a child who is nine, 
ten, or eleven years old could be customarily adopted, depending upon the circumstances.”188  
Sorting out the traditional customs of the Northern Marianas is not likely to get an easier 
as the culture continues to change. As Professor Herald points out, economic development and 
changes toward higher standards of living inevitably result in cultural change.189 The 2000 
census showed that the CNMI is home to 44,400 immigrants out of a total population of 
69,221.190 According to a second quarter, 1999 census count, the largest ethnic group on Saipan 
was Filipino.191 Since children born to these immigrants are automatically U.S. citizens, they 
may stay in the CNMI and leave a permanent impact on the culture.192  
A 1995 census found only 12,783 Chamorro speakers in the CNMI, out of a combined 
Chamorro and Carolinian population of 20,161.193 Many children aged 13 and below do not 
speak Chamorro at all.194 The question then arises, what is the prevailing custom from which 
customary law should be drawn?  
 The CNMI Supreme Court in Estate of Rangamar attempted to provide an answer: 
 
188 Id., citing In re Estate of Lorenzo Rofag, No. 89-019, 2 N.M.I. 18, 23 n.3, 1991 WL 70067 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 
22, 1991);  see also Estate of Remedio Malite, No. 06-0163 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. May 25, 2006), (Order Confirming 
the Mwei Mwei Adoption of Jesus Somol and Recognizing the Estate of Jesus Somol as an Heir to the Estate of 
Remedio Malite) (relying on expert witness’s opinion on mwei mwei of older children and disregarding Spoehr’s 
suggestion that children were “mwei mweied” as babies and that their surnames were changed to reflect the 
adoption)); Arriola v. Arriola, Nos. 97-049, 6 N.M.I. 1, 1 n.1, 1999 MP 13 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999) 
(questioning claim regarding custom of a “kiridu” (favorite child) as described by Spoehr). 
189 Marybeth Herald, supra note 44, at 747; see also Temengil v. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 881 F.2d 647 
(9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 925 (1990) (“The United States' administration of the Trust Territory 
produced a rapid change in the economy of the islands, substituting a money economy for the subsistence economy 
familiar to the people. . . .Thus the local inhabitants to a large extent lived off the rents obtained from the family 
land.”).  
190 Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Economic Report, October 2003, at 5, 
http://166.122.164.43/jcc/reports/cnmi03.pdf (last visited September 15, 2007). 
191 Central Statistics Division, Department of Commerce, The CNMI Current Labor Force Survey: Second Quarter, 
1999 Summary,  http://www.pacificweb.org/DOCS/cnmi/pdf/992ndlbfs.pdf (last visited September 5, 2007). 
192 See Herald, supra note 44, at 747. 
193 Beverley A. Lomosad, Say what? Speak Chamorro, Saipan Tribune, Feb. 26, 1999, 
http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=1217&cat=3. 
194 Id. 
 
8 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 65 
 
 
                                                
We agree that custom over time may gradually change by a uniform and common 
change in practice. However, such changes are neither legally binding [n]or 
accepted customs until they have at least existed long enough to have become 
generally known and have been peaceably and fairly uniformly acquiesced in by 
those whose rights would naturally be affected. Mere agreement to new ways of 
doing things by those to be benefitted without the consent of those to be adversely 
affected, will not of itself work a sudden change of customary law. 195
 
 This opinion appears to empower the Court to be the cultural keeper of society, capable 
of deciding when and if a custom has been around long enough to be enforced upon “those 
whose rights would naturally be affected.” Given the increasing intermarriage between people of 
Northern Mariana Islands descent and non-natives, 196 as well as the large number of non-natives 
involved in land transactions or criminal jury trials, those whose rights may be affected now 
include a diverse array of society.  
 As stated in Estate of Isaac Kaipat, following customary law may require a shift in the 
determination of just what constitutes this law.197 Through its initial efforts to codify law into the 
1984 CNMI Code, the Legislature seems to have recognized that certain traditions (such as oral 
conveyances other than the partida) are unworkable in the modern Northern Marianas. Other 
traditions can and should be applied. Rather than allowing the judiciary to decide which customs 
to apply and how to apply them, the CNMI Legislature should revise the statutory code to better 
address customary law. In the meantime, litigants are subject to an unpredictable application of 
statutes, customary law according to the most convincing expert witness, common law according 
to the Restatement, or whatever else the court can extract from U.S. jurisprudence. 
 
195 No. 92-029, 4 N.M.I. 72, 77, 1993 WL 614806 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15, 1993) (citations and internal quotes 
omitted). 
196 See Estate of Charles Reyes, No. 06-0554 (Petition to Allow Claim by an Omitted Spouse and/or Judgment 
against the Estate Arising from Common Law Relationship) (on file with the author, case currently pending before 
the Superior Court).  Petitioner, a native of the Philippines in a relationship with a Northern Marianas Chamorro, 
sought to apply the Chamorro custom of gumagachong (similar to common law marriage) to obtain a share of her 
deceased partner’s estate.  
197 No. 05-0247, slip op. at 7 n.4  (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2006) (Order Following Evidentiary Hearing and 
Denying Heirship Claim on Behalf of the Estate of Dolores K. Pelisamen). 
